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FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAV-SELF-INcRImINATION-APPLICATION TO LABOR UNIONS.--
The District Court of the United States for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
issued a 'subpoena, duces tecum directed to an unincorporated labor union asking that
certain records belonging to the union be produced before a Grand Jury. The records
which obviously were germane to the inquiry being conducted by the Grand Jury
were in the possession of an official of the union. There was no evidence to show
whether or not he was a member of the union. Although the union official was
not subpoenaed personally nor any effort made to examine him personally as a
witness, he declined to produce the demanded documents on the ground that they
might incriminate the local union, the international office of the union or himself
as an officer thereof. The District Court adjudged the official guilty of contempt
of court and sentenced him to thirty days in prison. The Third Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed the District Court's judgment by a divided vote on the ground
that the records of an unincorporated labor union were the property of all its mem-
bers and that if respondent were a union member and the books and records would
have tended to incriminate him, he could properly refuse to produce them. Upon
appeal the Supreme Court reversed and upheld the judgment of the District Court.
Held, The Union and its officers acting in their official capacity lack the privilege
of insulating the union's books and records against reasonable demands of govern-
mental authorities. United States v. Jasper White, - U. S. -, 64 Sup. Ct. 1248
(1944).
The privilege against self incrimination is peculiar to English and American juris-
prudence. It is first found in the English common law where it arose largely from
abuses of the star chamber.1 In America in 1776 it was contained in Section 8 of
the Virginia Declaration of Rights,2 and subsequently it was included as the Fifth
Amendment to our Federal Constitution.3 However, both in its origin and as
presently concerned, the privilege is personal to the witness. Hence it has been
limited to include only the witness's own testimony and his own private papers.4
The privilege against self incrimination was intended to free an individual from the
compulsory extortion of testimony or production of private papers that would tend
to connect him with a crime,5 but it was not intended that the privilege be a
1. 4 WiOSmOIE, EVDhENCE (2d ed. 1923) § 2250; Corwin, The Supreme Court's Con-
struction of the Self-Incrimination Clause (1939) 29 MicH. L. Rxv. 8-10.
2. A review of the history of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments is to be found in
In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 291 N. W. 652 (1940).
3. "No person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ... Y U. S. CoNsT. A=Xm. V.
4. Corwin, supra note 1; Weeks v. U. S., 232 U. S. 383 (1914).
5. Boyd v. U. S., 116 U. S. 616 (1885). In the trial of Aaron Burr for treason Chief
Justice Marshall had occasion to discuss the extent of the immunity necessary to overcome
the Constitutional privilege against self incrimination, and in ruling on the question he
said: "Many links frequently compose that chain of testimony which is necessary to
convict any individual of a crime. It appears to the Court to be a true sense of the rule
that no witness is compellable to furnish any one of them against himself." BuR's
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refuge that would free a man from producing documentary evidence that might
tend to incriminate him when such documentary evidence consisted of something
other than his own private papers. 6 Nor can the witness claim the privilege on
behalf of a corporation when he is an officer of the corporation to whom the docu-
ments belong, because when the state grants incorporation it reserves to itself the
right to exact compliance with its regulations, including the keeping of books and
records which are open to inspection by the state.7
The difficulty is not in stating these rather well settled principles, but in applying
them to particular cases. The instant case, while novel to the extent that it dealt
with the claim of privilege on behalf of a semi-corporate orgafiization, is not a depar-
ture from settled principles of constitutional law. This decision is not an innovation
in the sense that it disturbs any of these principles. Rather the decision turns upon
the application of those principles after a consideration of the relationship which
exists between an unincorporated labor union and its members.
The modem labor union is a very different organization from the labor union
of a hundred years ago. 8 We have come a long way from the theory that to be a
member of a labor union was akin to criminality,9 and the kindred doctrines in
Adair v. United States' and Coppage v. Kansasll which upheld the right of an
employer to require as a condition of employment the signing by a prospective em-
ployee of an agreement not to join a labor union.' 2 The present day union, inter-
national in scope, with its many interests and great power in controlling the rights
of its members, has long since lost the intimate character of personal association
and control of its affairs by the individual members.' 3 Labor unions can no longer
TPAL, Vol. 1, p. 244, quoted in In re Watson, 293 Mich. 263, 267, 291 N. W. 652, 656
(1940).
6. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43 (1908). It has also been held that the constitu-
tional privilege does not relieve a person from compliance with the substantive obligation
to surrender property, e. k., a bankrupt may be required to surrender books and,papers,
although they contain incriminating evidence against him, since the books and records
belong to the bankrupt estate. McCarthy v. Arnstein, 266 U. S. 341(1924). Furthermore,
the constitutional protection is aimed at testimonial compulsion, and is not violated when
a defen4ant is compelled to exhibit himself or a part of his body to the jury or to allow
a record of his fingerprints to be taken. 2 WiLLouGHBY, Mz CoNsTiTuTrIoN oF TE UNITED
STATEs § 719; (1918) 27 YALF L. J. 412; People v. Van Wormer, 175 N. Y. 188, 67
N. E. 299 (1903); see People v. Esposito, 287 N. Y. 389, 39 N. E. (2d) 925 (1942).
7. Wilson v. U. S., 221 U. S. 361 (1911).
8. See, WEBB, HISTORY oF ThADE UmoNIsm (1911) 185; Chamberlain, The Judicial
Process in Labor Unions (1940) 10 BRooxLYN L. RE. 145.
9. Cf. Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Metc. 111 (Mass. 1842).
10. 208 U. S. 161 (1908).
11. 236 U. S. 1 (1915).
12. These agreements, known as "yellow dog contracts" are prohibited by federal legis-
lation and by legislation in most 'of the states. National Labor Relations Act, 49 STAT.
449, 29 U. S. C. (1935); Smith and Delancey, The State Legislatures and Unionism,
(1940) 38 MIcr. L. REV. 987, 989.
13. Newman, The Closed Union and the Right to Work (1942) 43 CoL. L. REV. 42.
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in many respects be regarded, as they were in the early nineteenth century, as no
more than the aggregate of their members and, for that reason, quite unlike the cor-
poration.'
4
Within recent years there have been attempts by legal philosophers to assimilate
corporations and unincorporated groups into a single conception. 15 However, the
orthodox common law view has persisted that a corporation is a separate legal entity
with a personality distinct from that of its members.16 "The Corporation is a
person and its owneiship is a non-conductor that makes it impossible to attribute
an interest in its property to its members."' 7 Perhaps the essential distinction
between the corporation and the unincorporated group is that the former is created
by the legislature as a distinct legal person and, therefore, intended by the legisla-
ture to be treated as such, whereas other non-corporate business or social units
result from common law arrangements and are denied by the law separate legal
personality. 8 Does it follow that it is improper for the legislature, or the courts in
carrying out what appears to be the legislative intent, to treat the unincorporated
group for some purposes as though it were? as a group, separate from the constituent
members? 19 There is nothing in the in'herent nature of an unincorporated group
which should prevent the legislature 'at times from dealing with such a group as
though it were incorporated. 20 For instance, it was the common law view that an
unincorporated association could not be a party to an action in its own name. 21
This procedural defect has been cured in many jurisdictions b statute 2 The Su-
preme Court of the United States has overcome this procedural objection without
14. Witmer, Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Corporation
(1941) 51 YALE L. J. 40.
15. Machen, Corporate Personality (1911) 24 HAgv. L. REv. 253, 347; Radin, The
Endless Problem of Corporate Personality (1932) 32 CoL. L. REV. 643; Laski, The Per-
sonality of Associations (1916) 29 HAgv. L. REv. 404; Farmers Loan and Trust Co. v.
Pierson, 130 Misc. 110, 114, 222 N. Y. Supp. 532, 538 (Sup. Ct. 1927).
16. Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U. S. 267, 273 (1907); Brooklyn
Savings Bank v. Weschler Estate, 259 N. Y. 9, 14, 180 N. E. 752, 753 (1932).
17. Holmes, J. in Klein v. Board of Supervisors, 282 U. S. 19, 24 (1930).
18. See note 16 supra.
19. Professor Warren states that the courts may not treat as legal units enterprises
which the legislature has not created as such. WAREN, CoRorE ADvANTAGES WITHouT
INcORPORATION (1929) 1-13.
20. Dodd, Dogma and Practice in the Law of Association (1929) 42 HAsv. L. REV.
977; (1941) 39 MIcH. L. REV. 1240. Similarly, there is nothing to prevent the courts from
dealing with a corporation for some purposes as though it were unincorporated. The well
known examples of drawing the corporate veil may be noted in this connection.
WORMSER, DISREGARD or THE CORPORATE FICTION (1927)passim.
21. Baskins v. United Mine Workers of America, 150 Ark. 398, 401, 234 S. W. 464,
465 (1921); Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 78 N. W. 753 (1906); Representative cases
are collected in Sturges, Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions (1934) 33
YALE L. J. 383.




the aid of a statute in United Min Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co.23
In the latter case, the Supreme Court followed English precedent established by
the House of Lords in the Taff Vale case 24 in which the union's contention that
because it was not a corporation it could not be sued as an artificial entity was over-
ruled. It was felt that otherwise there would be the anomalous situation of the
existence of numerous parties, all capable of acting in concert and of owning great
wealth and exercising extensive power, who could act by agents and, because of the
difficulty of joining all members in a suit, be practically free of the responsibility
for wrongs that they may do to others. But despite the principle enunciated in the
Coronado case there have been many decisions since 1922 holding to the common
law principle that an unincorporated association is a mere aggregate of men.2 5
Whether an unincorporated group is intended to be effected by the provisions
of a contract depends upon the contractual intent of the parties to the contract.26
Whether an unincorporated group is to be included within the purview of a statute
depends upon the legislative intent.2 7 Finally, whether an unincorporated group is
within or without the protection of a constitutional guaranty such as the Fifth
Amendment depends upon the presumed intent of the framers of the Bill of Rights
had they visualized the existence of such a group when the constitutional provision
was drafted.2 8 The real issue in the instant case, therefore, is whether the Fifth
Amendment was ever intended by those who framed it to protect from self incrimi-
nation the group treated as a group. To determine this question the Supreme Court
did not find it necessary to consider the exact legal status of an unincorporated
labor union, or to extend, or impose any novel limitations on, the protection afforded
by the Fifth Amendment. Rather, it examined the nature of the union to ascertain
whether it had "a character so impersonal in the scope of its-membership and activi-
ties that it could not be said to embody or represent the purely private or personal
interests of its constituents, but rather to embody their common or group interests
only."2 9 The lower court had decided this case on the theory that the labor union
23. United Mine Workers v. Coronado Co., 259 U. S. 344 (1922).
24. Taff Vale Ry. v. -Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants (1901) A. C. 426.
25. Collected citations to these decisions will be found in Witmer, supra note 14, at 42,
n. 9.
26. Concurring opinion of Bradley, J. in Liverpool Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 77
U. S. 566, 576 (1870); Hibbs v. Brown, 190 N. Y. 167, 82 N. E. 1108 (1907); Hartigan v.
Casualty Co. of America, 227 N. Y. 175, 124 N. E. 789 (1919).
27. Section 37 of the New York General Construction Law provides: "The term person
includes a corporation and a joint-stock association." Also see Heeht v. Malley, 265 U. S.
144 (1924).
28. In Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537 (1928) it was held that, notwithstanding
Art. IV, § 2 of the U. S. Constitution which provides, "The citizens of each State shall
be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States," a state
might lawfully classify as a foreign corporation a business trust organized in another
state. The court said at page 550, "Whether a given associaiton is called a corporation,
partnership, or trust, is not the essential factor in determining the powers of a state con-
cerning it. The real nature of the organization must be considered." Liverpool Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 77 U. S. 566 (1870); Paul v. Virginia, 8 Wall. 168 (U. S. 1869).
29. - U. S. - , 64 Sup. Ct. 1248, 1252 (1944).
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did not derive its existence from any charter granted by the state and was, there-
fore, not subject to the visitatorial power of the state and that its books and papers
were not public in character but the private documents of union members who did
not have to keep records if they did not wish to do so.3 ° The answer to these con-
tentions is that the power to compel the production of incriminating books and
records is not limited solely to those subject to the power of visitation of the
state. It is restricted to anyone not a "person" within the meaning of the immu-
nity provision of the Fifth Amendment.31 The effect of the decision in the principal
case is to deny that an unincorporated labor union was intended by those who framed
our Bill of Rights to be included within the scope of the word "person" used in
the self-incrimination provision of the Constitution.32 In addition any aliquot or
residual interest in the assets of a labor union which a member, or a part owner,
may theoretically possess would certainly appear to be insufficient to characterize the
books and records of the union as the private or personal records of the mem-
bers.33 The members as a group, and not individually, own the books and records
of the union. This is the essential basis for the holding in the principal case.
The holding in the principal case apparently eliminates one reason for the recent
agitation for legislation requiring labor unions to be incorporated.3 4 Their records
are now open to proper investigation as they would be if they were incorporated 35
The decision proceeds along orthodox lines. Its chief interest lies not in any novel
statement of the law, but in its clarification of the self incrimination immunity as
applied to that much-discussed and increasingly important phenomenon in our daily
lives, the labor union.
30. 137 F. (2d) 24 (C. C. A. 3d, 1943), (1944) 17 So. CALIn. L. REv. 322; 7 U. of
DETROIT L. J. 22 (1943).
31. See note 3 supra.
32. See note 28 supra. This would seem to be the effect of the holding because the
privilege was asserted on behalf of the union. See Proskauer, Corporate Privilege Against
Self Incrimination (1911) 11 COL. L. REv. 44.5 which wds written before Wilson v. U. S.,
221 U. S. 361 (1911) cited supra note 7, was decided.
33. Even in the case of a partnership it may be contended that the tenancy in part-
nership, recognized by Section 25 of the Uniform Partnership Act (7 U. L. A. Sec. 25),
makes the property of the partnership, including its books and records, the property of
the firm considered as a separate entity and not that of the members of the firm. See
Crane, The Uniform Partnership Act-A Criticism (1915) 28 HARv. L. REv. 762; Crane,
The Uniform Partnership and Legal Persons (1916) 29 HARv. L. REv. 838. However, the
draftsman of the Uniform Act, is of the opinion that the Act treats a partnership as
a mere aggregate and his conclusions seem to be warranted. Lewis, The Uniform Partner-
ship Act-A Reply (1915) 29 HARv. L. REV. 158, (1916) 291; Commissioners' Note to
Uniform Partnership Act § 1, 7 U. L. A. 3. The courts have sustained the privilege against
self-incrimination in favor of a partnership. Internal Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed.
138 (W. D. N. Y. 1923); U. S. v. Brasley, 268 Fed. 59 (W. D. Pa. 1920).
34. Colorado State Labor Peace Act of 1943, c. 131, § 20, declared unconstitutional
in AFL v. Reilly, Colo., D. C., City and Cty. of Denver, 3d Div. 9.7/43 No. A-37373,
Prentice Hall p. 20687, ff 20,743.
35. See section 117 of the Revenue Act of 1943 amended 28 U. S. C. A. 54 by adding
another subdivision, (f), requiring organizations exempt from taxation, such as labor
unions, to file an informatiofi retuin and to keep records.
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HOmICIDE-FELONY MURDER-NATuRE AND CONTINUANCE OF THE UNDERLYING
FELONY.7-The defendant, armed with a loaded rifle, went to the home of the parents
of his estranged wife. He told her to return to his home. She refused. There was
a scuffle. The father of the victim entered the room. The defendant pointed the
rifle at the father and told him not to approach closer. The defendant then laid
the gun on the table and removed his jacket, saying: "I'll clean up the whole damn
bunch of you." The father told the 'defendant that no one was at fault and,the
defendant replied, "Rube, I don't think you are to fault. I have always liked you."
The father testified that he and the defendant then ,shook hands. The defendant
then picked up the rifle and pointed it at his wife, saying to her that if she did
not go home with him, he would kill her. She refused. He then shot and killed her.
The defendant was convicted of felony murder and he appealed. Held, judgment
affirmed. Three judges dissented. People v. Luscomb, 292 N. Y. 390, 55 N. E. (2d)
469 (1944).
At common law, murder was committed when one unlawfully killed a human being
with malice aforethought.' Malice aforethought (or prepense), if we confine its
meaning to "intent to kill," could be classified as actual if it were proved directly
or if it could be inferred as a fact from the circumstances of the killing.2 Even
if intent to kill actually did not exist, malice aforethought would be implied by the
law in certain cases. 3 One of the outstanding cases in which malice aforethought
would be implied is a killing during the commission of a felony.4 In practical effect,
this meant that it was not necessary to prove intent to kill in order to convict a
person of felony murder at common law. Malice aforethought implied in law was
merely a legal fiction.5.
The New York statute which defines felony murder also specifically eliminates
"intent to kill," and apparently does not restrict the underlying felony to those
1. 4 BL. CoMM. § 195; 3 COKE, INST. 47; 1 WnARTON, CpmmNAL LAW (12th ed. 1932)
§ 419.
2. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Aforethought (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 537.
3. Malice would be implied in law if the mere doing of extremely reckless acts resulted
in fatality under circumstances which made killing almost inevitable; or if the victim were
an officer of the law and was killed in the performance of his duties; or if the killing
took place during the commission of a felony. In such cases the presumption of- malice
was a matter of law and irrebuttable. New York Law Revision Commission Report, LEG.
Doc. No. 65 (1937) 533, 534,
4. Regina v. Sern, 16 Cox C. C. 311 (1887).
5. "It has therefore been truly said that the term 'malice aforethought' is now only
an arbitrary symbol." Hitchler, The New Definition of Murder in the First Degree (1924)
29 DicmnsoN L. REv. 63, 68. "'Malice aforethought' had been distorted out of all rela-
tion with its literal and natural meaning." New York Law Revision Commission Report,
LEG. Doc. No. 65 (1937) 540.
6. "Murder in First Degree defined. The killing of a human being . . . is murder in
the first degree, when committed ...without a design to effect death, by a person en-
gaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a felony... ." N. Y. PENAL LAW
§ 1044; Cox v. People, 80 N. Y. 500 (1880); Dolan v. People, 64 N. Y. 485, 498 (1876);
People v. Sobieskoda, 235 N . Y. 411, 139 N. E. 558 (1923).
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which are "dangerous to human life, ' 7 as is done in many jurisdictions.8 However,
in New York, it has been held, out of necessity, that some felonies cannot furnish
the basis for felony murder and are merged in the homicide. Otherwise the distinc-
tion made by the legislature between the various degrees of homicide would be
meaningless. For instance, since nearly all criminal homicides are accompanied by
a felonious assault, to allow the felonious assault upon the person killed to constitute
the basis for a felony murder, would be to make nearly all criminal homicides murder
in the first degree. This would appear to be the practical explanation for the so-
called "merger doctrine" in New York.9 But this explanation is not readily apparent
from an examination of the New York cases. A typical definition may be found
in People v. Hiter.'° In a commonly used and more general expression it is said
the -felony must be "independent of the homicide". l
Another requirement set out in the New York statute is that the killing and the
felony be contemporaneous.' 2 Whether or not this requirement was met in the
principal case was one of the important points of controversy. In holding that the
killing of the wife and the assault -upon the father-in-law were contemporaneous,
the majority relied upon three cases: People v. Giblin,13 People v. PatinMI' 4 and
People v. Wagner,15 in each of which the defendant's conviction of felony murder
7. This distinction was early made in Regina v. Semi, 16 Cox C. C. 311 (1887).
3 STEPH N, HISTORY OF THE C flnmqA LAW (1883) 57.
8. People v. Goldvarg, 346 Ill. 398, 178 N. E. 892 (1931); Patterson v. State, 181
Ga. 698, 184 S. E. 309 (1936); State v. Glover, 33 Mo. 709, 50 S. W. (2d) 1049 (1932)
87 A. L. R. 414 (1933). Most states enumerate the felonies which may form the basis
for felony murder. These "dangerous" felonies most commonly listed are arson, burglary,
rape and robbery. CONN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 6043; IND. STAT. AN. (Burns, 1933)
§ 10-3401; PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 18, § 2221.
9. Corcoran, Felony Murder in New York (1937) 6 FoRDHA. L. REv. 47; People v.
Wagner, 245 N. Y. 143, 148, 156 N. E. 644 (1927); People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y. 516, 100
N. E. 444 (1912).
10. 184 N. Y. 237, 244, 77 N. E. 6, 8 (1906): "In order, therefore, to constitute murder
in the first degree by the unintentional killing of another while engaged in the commission
of a felony, we think that while the violence may constitute a part of the homicide, yet
the other elements constituting the felony in which he is engaged must be so distinct
frofil that of the homicide as not to be an ingredient of the homicide, indictable therewith
or convictable thereunder."
11. "The felony that eliminates the quality of the intent must be one that is inde-
pendent of the homicide and of the assault merged therein) as, e.g., robbery or larceny or
burglary or rape." Cardozo, Ch.J., in People v. Moran, 246 N. Y. 100, 102, 158 N. E.
35, 36 (1927). "No revealing analysis of the criterion of 'independence' has appeared in
the cases. . . ." Wechsler and Michael, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide (1937) 37
CoL. L. REv. 716.
12. "... by a person engaged in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit a
felony ... " N. Y. PzNAL LAW § 1044, People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E. 535
(1919).
13. 115 N. Y. 196, 21 N. E. 062 (1889).
14. 208 N. Y. 176, 101 N. E. 694 (1913).
15. 245 N. Y. 143, 156 N. E. 644 (1927).
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was affirmed. In the Giblin, case, the defendant, while struggling with the husband
of the deceased and holding his hand behind himself, shot and killed the deceased,
who was attempting to pull the defendant away from her husband. In the Patini
case the deceased approached the defendant while the latter was threatening to shoot
the brother of the deceased. The defendant warned the deceased not to interfere,
otherwise he would shoot him "too".16 The defendant shot the deceased and then
the latter's brother. The court held that the felonious assault on the br6ther of the
deceased was only temporarily interrupted when he turned the gun away from him
in order to shoot the deceased. The Wagner case seems to represent a further de-
parture from the holding of the Giblin case. In that case the defendant was strug-
gling with his landlady and had struck her with a blackjack when the deceased came
to her rescue. The defendant released the landlady, who ran downstairs to the
front door and called for help. While she was doing this, the defendant shot and
killed the deceased. The landlady rushed back upstairs and started to beat the
defendant, who struck her a blow and then escaped. The court held that the fatal
assault began at a moment when the assault on the landlady was "in progress,"
citing the Patini case.1 7 This holding of the court apparently disregards the brief
interval of time which elapsed between the defendant's release of his hold on the
landlady and his assault on the deceased. There was no evidence that the defendant
intended to ' continue his original assault on the landlady,' 8 and in this respect, the
holding appears to have been an extension to that in the Patini case. 19
Conceding this to be the state of the law at the time that the instant case was
decided, how can it be said that the killing of the defendant's wife in the principal
case was contemporaneous with the assault on his father-in-law? The conclusion
of the court does not appear to be supported by the Giblin case. According to the
People's evidence, the defendant's wife made no attempt to interfere with the
defendant in his allegedly continuing assault against her father.2 0 The conclusion
of the court cannot fairly be supported by the Patini case, because there is lacking
evidence that the assault on the father was merely temporarily interrupted and that
the defendant intended to continue the assault on the father. In fact, the evidence
of the prosecution is all the other way.21 And even under the Wagner case it is
16. 208 N. Y. 176, 179, 101 N. E. 694, 695 (1913).
17. 245 N. Y. 143, 152, 156 N. E. 644, 646 (1927).
18. The original assault with the blackjack upon the landlady would constitute a feloni-
ous assault, since a dangerous weapon was used. N. Y. PENAL LAW § 242 (4). In its
opinion the court does not state that a dangerous weapon was used by the defendant to
strike the blow at the landlady when he was escaping or that she was wounded or seriously
injured. Therefore, it would not appear that the latter assault was a felony.
19. Id. at 149, 156 N. E. at 646. Had the landlady not left the room, it might be
that the conviction could be supported under the Patini theory of temporary interruption.
But it is clear that when the object of the assault has escaped from the reach of danger,
the assault was not merely interrupted, but had terminated. People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y.
298, 189 N. E. 225 (1934); People v. Marwig, 227 N. Y. 382, 125 N. E. 535 (1919).
20. The theory of the defense was apparently that the killing was accidental; the
defendant testified that his gun went off when his wife grabbed him by the arm and
swung him around while he was talking to her father.
21. Shortly before the defendant killed his wife, he said to her father: "Rube, I don't
19441
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
difficult to find support for the holding of the court. Can it be said that the acts
culminating in the killing had their inception when the assault was yet in progress?
This necessitates an analysis of the underlying felony claimed in this case: the
assault on the father.22
The majority opinion seems to proceed upon the assumption that the assault on
the father continued as long as the latter remained in fear that the defendant might
harm him.23 This assumption ignores the intent of the defendant and considers
only the state of mind of the victim. On the question of whether actual intent to
injure, regardless of the alleged victim's fear of injury, is necessary to make out
the crime of assault (as distinguished from the tort of assault 24 ), the decisions
outside New York25 and the textwriters 26 are in hopeless conflict. There does not
think you are to fault. I have always liked you." The father of the victim testified that
the defendant then shook hands with him. (This the defendant denied.) The conduct of
the defendant after the homicide also serves to demonstrate that he had no intention of
molesting his father-in-law any further. He picked up his dying wife, put her on the cot
in their living room, and told Eck to get a doctor.
22. "A person who . . . wilfully and wrongfully assaults another by the use of a
weapon, or other instrument or thing likely to produce grievous bodily harm . . .is guilty
of assault in the second degree." N. Y. PENAL LAW § 242 (4).
23. The majority opinion states that if the father was restrained by the original threat
of the defendant that .he would shoot him if he interfered with the defendant and if the
killing took place "while he was in the grip of fear produced by that threat," it would
be felony murder. 292 N. Y. 390, 398, 55 N. E. (2d) 469, 473 (1944). The dissenting
opinion, while it admits that the jury might infer that the father remained in fear after
the defendant shook hands with him, held that "temporarily at least the assault against
Eck had ceased." Id. at 404, 55 N. E. (2d) at 477.
24. "There need be no actual intention or power to use violence, for it is enough if the
plaintiff on reasonable grounds believes that he is in danger of it. Thus, it is actionable
to point a gun at a man in 'a threatening manner, even though to the knowledge of the
defendant, but not to that of the plaintiff, it is unloaded. But if there is no reasonable
fear, there is no assault: as, for example, when a gun is pointed at a man behind his
back." 'SALMOND, ToRrs (9th ed. 1936) 371; CooLEY, TORTs (3d ed. 1906) *184; HARPER,
TORTS (1933) § 19. The state of mind of the victim is the important factor in a civil
suit for assault. There is no civil wrong if the victim is not aware of the assault. PROssER,
TORTS (1941) § 10. (1909) 57 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 249. However, in the case of a criminal
assault, the consciousness of the victim should not be the important factor, but rather
the intent of the defendant. State v. Barry, 45 Mont. 598, 124 Pac. 775 (1912) ; People v.
Lilley, 43 Mich. 521, 5 N. W. 982 (1880). Smith, The Misuse of the Tort Definition of an
Assault in a Criminal Action (1939) 11 Rocxy MT. L. R!v. 104.
25. In the following cases it was held that there was a criminal assault even though
there was no intent to harm, but at most an intent to frighten: Commonwealth v. White,
110 Mass. 407 (1872); Smith v.,State, 32 Tex. 593 (1870). Contra: Chapman v. State,
78 Ala. 463 (1885); State v. Davis, 23 N. C. 125, 35 Am. Dec. 735 (1840); State v. Sears,
86 Mo. 169 (1885); People v. Dodel, 77 Cal. 293, 19 Pac. 484 (1888); State v. Godfrey,
17 Ore. 300, 20 Pac. 625 (1889).
26. The following writers are of the opinion that no intent to injure is required for
an assault if the victim is actually in fear: 1 WHARTON, CaxwAL LAW (12th ed.) § 800
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appear to be any square holding in New York on the question, although there are
dicta both ways.27 It is submitted that the determining factor in a criminal assault
should be the intent of the defendant and not the mental agitation of the supposed
victim. A crime consists of a combination of act and intent. The mens rea required
by the generally accepted definition of a criminal assault is an intent to injure and
not merely to frighten.28 If there is a mere intention to frighten, or if the supposed
victim has reasonable grounds to be frightened where actually there is no intent
to injure, there may be a tort or some other indictable offense, but it would seem
that the crime of assault, as it is known to the common law, has not been com-
mitted. There appears to be no evidence (certainly not sufficient to prove the fact
beyond a reasonable doubt) that the defendant had any intention of assaulting the
father after he spoke to him in an apparently friendly manner.
Finally, the conviction of the defendant in the principal case seems questionable
on a ground pointed out in the minority opinion. Mere contemporaneity between
the horiicide and the felony is not sufficient to spell out felony murder. There must
be a causal connection between the two.29 The homicide must have resulted from
an act performed in execution and in furtherance of the felony.30 As the dissenting
et seq.; 2 Bxsrop, CRrMuxAL LAW (9th ed.) § 32; 1 RussELL, Csn&ss (9th ed.) 1020.
Contra: MAY, CRaim=AL LAW (4th ed. 1938) § 157; MILrER, CanmqAL LAW (1934)
*98 (b).
27. In People v. Morehouse, 2 Silvernail 241, 6 N. Y. Supp. 763 (Gen'l Term, 4th
Dept. 1889)' the defendant admitted that the gun was loaded and cocked and there was
other evidence to corroborate this. The court held that it was not error for the trial court
to refuse to charge that if the gun were not loaded, no crime was committed. This dictum
is widely cited as representing that New York follows the Massachusetts case of Common-
/wealth v. White, in holding that the attitude of the victim, not the intent of the assailant,
determines whether or not the crime of assault has been committed. Supra, note 26. Subse-
quently, in People v. Tremaine, 129 Misc. 650, 653, 222 N. Y. Supp. 432, 436 (Sup. Ct.
1927), in which the indictment was dismissed on a procedural defect, the court said that
"in this state, however . . . pointing an unloaded firearm at another in a threatening
manner constitutes an assault where the party at whom it is aimed does not know that
it is not loaded, or has reason to believe that it is not and is, by the act of the menacing
party, put in fear of bodily harm." More recently, in the case of People v. Lay, 254 App.
Div. 372, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) 325 (2d Dept. 1938) aff'd mem. 279 N. Y. 737, 18 N. E. (2d),
686 (1939), a conviction of assault was affirmed. The court said: "An intentional shooting'
is an assault. But if a person intentionally points a gun at another without intent to do
harm, and discharges the gun without intent to do harm, as is sometimes recklessly done
in jest, then an assault is not committed. . . " Id. at 373, 5 N. Y. S. (2d) at 327.
28. "It seems that an Assault is an Attempt, or Offer, with Force and Violence, to do
corporal Hurt to another ... .' HAvxxs, PLEAS OF THE CROWN, Bk. 1, c. 62, 133 (1716).
29. "The formula that homicide committed while perpetrating or attempting a felony
is murder must also be challenged because it speaks in terms of a coincidence whereas the
requirement is causation. The word 'while' is inaccurate and misleading in this connection."
Perkins, A Re-Examination of Malice Aforethought (1934) 43 YALE L. J. 562.
30. People v. Ryan, 263 N. Y. 298, 189 N. E. 225 (1934). For a case in which it was
said that "if death ensued in consequence of that felony; the offence is brought directly
within the definition of the crime of murder in the first degree," see Buell v. People, 78
19441
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opinion well pointed out, even if it be assumed that the assault upon the father
was still in progress at the time the killing took place, it is clear that the act of
shooting the wife was not in any way committed in execution and in furtherance
of any assault on the father.3 ' On the contrary, the evidence apparently credited
by the jury indicates, if anything, that the allegedly continuing assault on the father
was in furtherance of the defendant's design to prevent any interference by the
father in the defendant's assault upon his wife.
To conclude, it must be remembered that all the detailed facts of a case rarely
make their appearance in the report of a court's opinion; that it is not always safe
to say that a particular case has been erroneously determined. Nevertheless, upon
the facts reported in the majority opinion it would seem that not only is the
holding of the majority an extension of existing precedents, but that it. is also in
some respects a reversal of established principles. Perhaps the decision indicates
a trend away from the highly technical distinctions which have heretofore permeated
the felony murder doctrine in New York.32 But it is respectfully submitted that any
such important change in the interpretation of a statute carrying the capital penalty
should come from the legislature.
INSURANcE-EsTOPPEL OR WAIVER RESULTING FROM FAILURE To DISCLAIm LIA-
BILITY.-Plaintiff, a subcontractor, was issued a public liability policy by defendant
insuring plaintiff against loss from liability for damages on account of bodily injuries.
including death, accidentally suffered by person other than an employee of plaintiff.
A pedestrian injured near the premises under construction brought suit against
plaintiff who immediately notified defendant. The general contractor was named as
co-defendant. In its answer, the general contractor filed a cross-complaint praying
for judgment against the sub-contractor in the event that recovery was had against
it. The cross-complaint was based upon a clause in the contract which provided:
"Subcontractor shall indemnify and save owner, architect, and contractor, harmless
against all claims for damages to persons growing out of the execution of the work."
Defendant's policy expressly excluded from coverage "liability of others assumed
by the assured under any agreement, oral or written." Defendant, however, assumed
full control of the entire defense, neither notifying plaintiff-subcontractor that the
cross-complaint had been interposed, nor disclaiming liability thereon. At the
trial of the personal injury action, the complaint against the subcontractor was
dismissed but the jury returned a verdict against the general contractor and a
verdict against the subcontractor on the cross-complaint. Judgment was entered on
the verdict. Plaintiff now seeks to recover from defendant under the terms of the
N. Y. 492, 497 (1879). Accord: People v. Hifter, 184 N. Y. 237, 77 N. E. 6 (1906);
People v. Spohr, 206 N. Y. 516, 100 N. E. 444 (1912).
31. Of course, this assumes that the jury did not believe that part of the defendant's
testimony that his gun was accidentally discharged when his wife swung him about. The
whole theory of the prosecution and the reasoning of the majority opinion disregards the
defendant's testimony.




aforementioned policy but defendant disclaims liability on the ground, among others,
of non-coverage. The Trial Court dismissed the complaint and the Appellate Division
affirmed. Upon appeal, held, judgment reversed, one judge dissenting. William M.
Moore Cotstruction Co., Inc., v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co., 293
N. Y. 218, 56 N. E. (2d) 74 (1944).
The Trial Court, in reaching its decision that the complaint against the defendant
should be dismissed, held that there had been no waiver of the exclusory clause
and that the only ground upon which the defense of non-coverage could be eliminated
was that of estoppel. It further held, nevertheless, that defendant was not estopped
from asserting its defense inasmuch as plaintiff had not been prejudiced by de-
fendant's assumption and control of the litigation on the cross-complaint, apparently
on the ground that the plaintiff would have been no more successful, even if it
had handled the defense.' The Court of Appeals, however, reversed the decision
of the lower court, treating the action of the defendant as an estoppel to assert
the defense of non-coverage. The Court of Appeals also held that prejudice to the
plaintiff as a result of defendant's conduct would be presumed.
This case provides an excellent example of the fundamental differences between
waiver and estoppel. Concededly the three courts involved herein would agree
that waiver alone could not create a liability independent of the contract. But estoppel,
if all the elements deemed necessary are satisfied, could create such a liability.
The legal concepts of waiver and estoppel as applied to the law of insurance have
long been the subject of mgich confusion. This has been due largely to the failure
of the courts to make an adequate distinction between the two terms.2 Waiver has
traditionally been defined as the intentional or voluntary relinquishment of a
known rigjit.3 It may be by words, either oral or written, or implied from the con-
duct of the insurer.4 The distinction between an express waiver and estoppel is
relatively easy to maintain; but where the waiver is to be implied from the con-
duct of the insurer, the line of distinction becomes rather fine 5 and sometimes
it is said that implied waiver is just another name for estoppel.6
Ordinarily a party to an insurance contract may waive any condition or privilege
inuring to his benefit.7 Here it is necessary, however, to differentiate between waiver
1. Assuming that the general contractor's negligence caused the injury, it would appear
that the holding of the Court of Appeals in Thompson Starrett Co. v. Otis Elevator Co.,
271 N. Y. 36, 2 N. E. (2d) 35 (1935), might have precluded a recovery against the sub-
contractor, on the ground that the indemnity provision was not to be construed as indem-
nifying the general contractor against his own negligence.
2. Oehme v. Johnson, 181 Minn. 138, 231 N. W. 817 (1930); see, VANCE, INSURANCE
(2d ed. 1930) 455.
3. Ansorge v. Belfer, 248 N. Y. 145, 161 N. E. 450 (1925) ; Lord Constr. Co. v. Edison
P. C. Co., 234 N. Y. 411, 138 N. E. 39 (1923).
4. Kiernan v. Duchess County Mutual Ins. Co., 150 N. Y. 190, 44 N. E. 698 (1896).
S. Bernard v. Rochester German Ins. Co., 79 Conn. 388, 65 At. 134 (1906); Gibson
Electric Co. v. Liverpool & L. & G. Ins. Co., 159 N. Y. 418, 54 N. E. 23 (1899); Arm-
strong v. Agricultural Ins. Co., 130 N. Y. 560, 29 N. E. 991 (1892).
6. Globe Mutual Ins. Co. v. Wolff, .95 U. S. 326 (1877); Inventasch v. Superior Fire
Ins. Co., 48 R. I. 321, 138 AtI. 39 (1927).
7. Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U. S. 149 (1911); Liddle v. Market Fire Ins. Co., 29 N. Y.
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of a condition furnishing ground for forfeiture and waiver, of an excepted risk or
loss.8 In the event of a breach of a condition or warranty, the policy, at the
election of the insurer may be forfeited and treated as no longer covering the risks
provided for therein. Since forfeitures of insurance policies, however, are frowned
upon by the law, the courts are quick to find circumstances indicating an intent on
the part of the insurer to waive a forfeiture, 9 and the election, once made, is irre-
vocable.' 0 However, while a condition of the contract may be waived, coverage can-
not be created by waiver. If a risk is not within the coverage of a policy either
because the language is not broad enough to include it or because it is expressly
excluded, no amount of waiver can bring it within the terms of the contract."
The simple reason for this is that such an excluded risk can only be insured
against by a new contract based upon a new consideration.
Estoppel, however, which was found to be present in the instant action, does
not require the ingredients of a contract to create liability. Estoppels are generally
classified as of three kinds:12 by record, by deed, and by matters in pais; the first
two-mentioned estoppels are very often referred to as, technical estoppels as distin-
guished from equitable estoppels or estoppels in pais.'8 The tenet of an equitable
estoppel is that a party may be precluded by his acts from asserting a right to the
detriment or prejudice of another, who, entitled to rely on such conduct, has acted
upon it.' 4 It appears to be a well-established rule of law that where a liability-
insurer assumes and conducts the defense of an action brought against the assured,
184 (1864); Divita v. N. Y. Life Ins. Co., 244 App. Div. 498, 279 N. Y. S. 900 (4th
Dep't. 1935).
8. Miller v. Illinois Bankers Life Asso., 138 Ark. 442, 212 S. W. 310 (1919) ; see,
RIcARDs, INSURANCE (4th ed. 1932) 170.
9. Knickerbocker Ins. Co. v. Norton, 96 U. S. 234 (1877) ; Howell v. Knickerbocker
Life Ins. Co., 44 N. Y. 276 (1871).
10. Brink v. Hanover'Fire Ins. Co., 80 N. Y. 108 (1880); McCoubray v. St. Paul
F. M. Ins. Co., 50 App. Div. 416, 64 N. Y. S. 1122 (2d Dep't 1900), aff'd 169 N. Y.
590 (1901).
11. Knight v. Shoaf, 166 Ind. 367, 77 N. E. 738 (1906) (policy excepted death
occurring during pregnancy); Ruddock v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 209 Mich. 638, 177 N. W.
242 (1920) (policy excepted death occurring while engaged in military service outside
of the United States); Gerka v. Fidelity Cas. Co.,"251 N. Y. 51, 167 N. E. 169 (1929)
(policy excluded injury to any person caused by assured's vehicle while being driven by or
in charge of any person under sixteen years of age); Draper v. Oswego Fire Asso., 190
N. Y. 12, 82 N. E. 755 (1907) (policy excepted from loss any fire built by assured with
his knowledge or consent within fifty feet from any insured building); see, 5 COOLEY,
INSURANCE (2d ed. 1929) 3953; Richards, op. cit. supra note 8 at 181; VANCE, Waiver and
Estoppel in Insurance Law (1925) 34 YALE L. J. 834, 849; 38 MICH. L. REv. 104 (1939).
See 3 WILrSToN, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 763.
12. Frost v. Saratoga Mut. Ins. Co., 5 Denio 154 (N. Y. 1848).
13. Welland Canal v. Hathaway, 8 Wend. 480 (N. Y. 1832).
14. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Childs, 230 N. Y. 285, 130 N. E. 295 (1921); Kier-
nan v. Duchess County Mutual Ins. Co., 150 N. Y. 190, 44 N. E. 698 (1896); N. Y.
Rubber Co. v. Rothery, 107 N. Y. 310, 14 N. E. 269 (1887).
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with knowledge of facts taking the injury, accident, etc., outside the coverage of
the policy and without disclaiming liability thereon or giving notice of its reser-
vation of rights, it is thereafter precluded in an action on the policy from setting
up the defense of non-coverage. 15 There need not be an intent to deceive or mislead
the assured if the conduct is such as to induce a reasonable man to rely upon it.' 6
The reasons which induce the insurer to assume the defense are also said to be
unimportant. 1 7
A second point herein involves the question of prejudice and its relation to the
doctrine of estoppel. The Trial Court and the Court of Appeal4 divided on tis
issue. The Trial Court held that there was no estoppel because prejudice to the
assured had not been proved. The Court of Appeals, on the other hand, held that
prejudice to the assured would be presumed. The general rule is: "There is not
" an estoppel unless plaintiff [assured] has been misled or injured.' s8 Some cases hold
that assured's injury must be shown by adequate proof,' 9 while others hold that
prejudice will be presumed.20 Where the prejudice is to be presumed, it is held that
the loss of the right to control and manage one's own case is itself a prejudice,
and assured need not be put to the proof that it could .or would have secured a
better result. 2 ' This presumption of prejudice is not rebuttable.22 It should be as-
sured's privilege' to enter into the conduct of its own defense, since it is to bear
the burden of the court's decision. The holding of the Court of Appeals is in
accord with the weight of authority.
15. Oehme v. Johnson, 181 Minn. 138, 231 N. W. 817 (1930); Fairbanks Canning Co.
v. London Guaranty & Accident Co., 154 Mo. App. 327, 133 S. W. 664 (1911); Gerka v.
Fidelity & Cas. Co., 251 N. Y. 51, 167 N. E. 169 (1929), Humes Constr. Co. v. Phila.
Cas. Co., 32 R. I. 246, 79 Ad. 1 (1905) ; see, 5 Cooley, op. cit. supra note 11 at 4534(h)
(1936) 16 BOSTON L. Rav. 236.
16. Globe Nay. Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 39 Wash. 299, 81 Pac. 826 (1905); Royle
Mining Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 126 Mo. App. 104, 103 S. W. -1098 (1907).
17. Empire State Surety Co. v. Pacific Natl Lumber Co., 200 Fed. 224 (C. ,C. A.
9th 1912) ; Oehme v. Johnson, 181 Minn. 138, 231 N. W. 817 (1930).
18. American Cereal Co. v. London Guarantee & Acc. Co., (C. C. A. 7th) 211 Fed.
96, 99 (1914).
19. Lunt v. Aetna L. Ins. Co., 261 Mass. 469, 159 N. E. 461 (1927) (Here, however,
the assured was represented by two attorneys, in addition to those provided by the in-
surer, who were present during the entire proceedings and participated in the defense of
the action. It, therefore, cannot be said that the assured was deprived of the right to
conduct its own defense); J. S. Sterns Lumber Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 159 Wis. 627,
150 N. W. 991 (1915) (A boy employed by the assured contrary to law was injured.
The policy did not cover this loss. The insurer disclaimed liability as soon as it learned
the boy's age and refused to defend the action. But this was done before the time
in which to file an answer to the suit had expired); see cases cited in 81 A. L. R. 1361;
Tozer v. Ocean Accident Guaranty Corp., 94 Minn. 478, 103 N. W. 509, 511 (1905) (dis-
senting opinion).
20, See note 15 supra.
21. See note 15 supra.
22. Royle Mining Co. v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 126 Mo. App. 104, 103 S. W. 1098 (1907).
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NEGLIGENCE-DUTY OF SALOONKEEPER TO PROTECT PATRON FROM HARMK OFF THE
PREmISES.-The plaintiff was a patron in the defendants' saloon. While there, he
was threatened by two other patrons who were intoxicated and who displayed knives
and expressed an intention to attack the plaintiff. Immediately, the bartender of
the saloon evicted the two drunkards and soon thereafter forcibly ejected the plain-
tiff over his protests and pleas that he be afforded the sanctuary of the bar as
protection from his two antagonists waiting outside. Upon being put into the street,
the plaintiff was set upon by the drunkards and seriously injured, for which in-
juries he sued the defendants, the owners of the bar. The court, after a trial without
a jury, denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and granted judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff for $1,000. Yastar v. Yakovac, -Misc.-, 48
N. Y. S. (2d) 128 (N. Y. City Ct. 1944).'
The trial court found as a matter of law2 that the bartender was acting within
the scope of his employment and in the interest of the defendants' business at the
time of ejecting the plaintiff. Therefore, the court went directly to the question of
the defendants' liability for the injuries resulting from the act of the bartender in
throwing the plaintiff off defendants' premises. In arriving at the conclusion that
the defendants were liable, the trial judge said in part: "The question is . . . was
Eddie negligent in failing to afford plaintiff the protection of defendants' premises
where he was lawfully a guest at the time. . . . To hold that defendants' duty to
protect plaintiff ended when their employee, Eddie, kicked him off their premises,
is to lose sight of the grave responsibility of an innkeeper in respect to his
guest. .. ."
The question of duty is basic in the law of torts and particularly in the tort of
negligence, for therein the -wrong is predicated directly upon the violation by a
defendant of some legal duty he owed to the plaintiff.3 It is just as accurate, there-
fore, to say that in the absence of such a duty there can be no legal wrong. 4
Where a duty does exist the gist of the wrong is either misfeasance, which con-
sists of affirmative action in the face of foreseeable harm resulting in injury to
another, or nonfeasance, which is failing to take some affirmative action in order
to prevent harm from befalling another. The distinction between the two is deeply
rooted in the comnmon law.5 A distinction between the results flowing from the
two has been pointed out by Professor Bohlen. 6 He points out that in the case of
the affirmative wrong, misfeasance, the injured party is substantially worse off.;
whereas in cases of nonfeasance, the injured party is, in reality, no worse off at
1. Aff'd without opinion, - Misc. -, - N. Y. S. (2d)-(App. Term, 1st Dep't.
1944).
2. Citing Mott v. Consumers' Ice Co., 73 N. Y. 543 (1878).
3. Green, The Duty Problem In'Negligence Cases (1928) 28 COL. L. REv. 1014.
4. ". . . and the converse proposition is that, where there is no legal duty to exercise
care, there can be no actionable negligence." 1 THowansox, NEGLIGENCE (1901) § 3.
5. Gautret v. Egerton, L. R. 2 C. P. 371, 375; HARPER, TORTS (1st ed. 1933) § 79.
2 KENT's CoMM. (14th ed., 1896) 570, 572; Scholl v. Belcher, 63 Ore. 310, 127 Pac. 968
(1912).
6. Bohlen, The Moral Duty to Aid Others As a Basis of Tort Liability (1908) 56 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 217, 220.
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all; rather he is merely deprived of a protection which, had it been afforded him,
would have been beneficial.
Liability for nonfeasance is the exception, not the rule. As a general rule, the
law imposes no duty upon one person to assist actively in the preservation from
injury of the person or property of another, even though the means by which the
harm can be averted are in his possession. 7 The common law regarded the individual
as capable of taking care of himself if not interfered with from without.8 The duty
to take affirmative action to protect one's fellow man is, in the ordinary situation,
a moral and not a legal duty.9 However, a person may owe such a legal duty to
another because of some relation which exists between the two. A fairly concise
classification of the relationships giving rise to this duty is:1°  (1) those obliga-
tions created by statute," (2) those arising out of the family relation,' 2 (3) those
annexed, by the policy of the law as necessary incidents to a relation voluntarily
assumed, normally varying in extent as the relation is gratuitous or beneficial to
him upon whom the obligation is laid.13 The existence in the first group of the
duty to take affirmative action to protect another is clear; the extent of the duty
depending entirely upon the legislative intent. As to the second group, the great
weight of modem legal authority is to recognize certain basic duties arising out of
the family relationship.14 The third class is by far the widest and most inclusive.
From many standpoints it resembles the contractual relationship. The duties under
this third class that apply to trades, business, places of public resort and profes-
sions are by far more complex -and confusing than those in the first two groups
mentioned. 'It is within this group that we find the common carrier and the com-
mon law innkeeper. The duties applied to this group are predicated, in the main.
upon the ability of the one to afford protection and the inability of the other to
protect himself. I
The plaintiff in the instant case, it is to be noted, proceeded upon the theory
7. "The actor's realization that action on his part is necessary for another's aid or
protection does not of itself impose upon him a duty to take such action." 2 RESTATE-
MrENT, TORTS (1934) § 314.
8. Bohlen, Voluntary Assumption of Risk I (1906) 20 HA.v. L. REv. 14.
9. "It is undoubtedly the moral duty of every person to extend to others assistance
when in danger. . . . And if such efforts should be omitted by anyone when they can
be made, without imperiling his own life, he would by his conduct, draw upon himself
the just censure and reproach of good men; but this is the only punishment to which
he would be subjected by society." U. S. v. Knowles, 4 Sawy. 517 (U. S. 1885) ; Buch v.
Amory, 69 N. H. 257, 260, 44 Atl. 809 (1898).
10. This three-fold classification is, for the most part, borrowed from Professor Bohlen's
article cited in note 6, supra.
11. Phillips v. Britannia Hygienic Laundry Co., [1923] 1 K. B. 539, 128 L. T. R. 690
(Divisional Court); Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 41 N. W. 543 (1889) ; Boronkay
v. Robinson & Carpenter, 247 N. Y. 365, 160 N. E. 400 (1928).
12. Territory v. Manton, 7 Mont. 162, 14 Pac. 637 (1887).
13. Passarello v. West Jersey & S. R. Co., 98 N. J. L. 790, 121 Atl. 708 (1923);
McNevins v. Lowe, 40 Ill. 209 (1866).
14. TnFANY, Do arsTic RELATIONs (3d ed. 1921) § 119.
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that the defendants were liable for failing to afford him protection from unlawful
acts of other patrons' 5 and that, therefore defendants' negligence lay in not giving
to the plaintiff the protection of their bar.16 This then was an allegation of negli-
gence based 'upon the defendants' nonfeasance. The trial justice seems to have
adopted the same theory of negligence, for in his opinion he states that the question
in the case is whether the bartender was negligent "in failing to afford plaintiff
the protection of defendants' premises."' 7 While not the same, this comes close
to holding that the duty of protection while on the premises, which could well be
supported by authority, extends to furnishing protection off the premises or, at
least, immediately adjoining the premises. To support its decision, the trial court
drew an analogy to the responsibility of an innkeeper in respeft to his guest.' 8
The present day "tavern" or "saloon" is not to be considered as the same type of
establishment ag the common law inn.19 The innkeeper was liable for injuries sus-
tained by a guest as the result of an assault by another guest or by an employee
of whose viciousness the innkeeper had knowledge. 20 This duty of protection is not,
however, confined to innkeepers. The courts have almost universally held that per- .
sons who maintain any establishment to which the general public is invited owe a
duty to their invitees so to supervise their premises that persons lawfully thereon
will not be unreasonably exposed to' danger. 21 In New York, it may be said, 'that
in general such establishments are those defined in the Civil Right Law Sec. 4 022
as "places of public accommodation".23 In referring to a saloonkeeper in one case,
15. A reference to the file in this case (City Ct., N. Y. Co., Index No. 59/1944)
shows that paragraph four of the plaintiff's complaint reads as follows: ". . .that at all
times hereinafter mentioned, it was the duty of the defendants in connection with the
aforesaid business of the Bar and Grill to afford protection to patrons from unlawful
acts of other patrons."
16. Paragraph 8 of plaintiff's Complaint (supra, note 15). "That the defendants were
careless and negligent at the aforesaid time and place in not giving to this plaintiff the
proper protection he required ..
17. - Misc. - , 48 N. Y. S. (2d) 128, 132.
18. id. at 134.
19. "...a house which is held out to the public as a place where all transient per-
sons who come will be received and entertained as guests for compensation." Pettit v.
Thomas, 103 Ark. 593, 148 S. W. 501 (1912). ". . . a house where a traveler is furnished
as a regular matter of business with food and lodging while on his journey." Cromwell
v. Stephens, 2 Daly 15 (N. Y. 1867); BEALE, IIJNKEEPERS AND HOTELS (1906) § 4.
20. See Rahmel v. Lehndorff, 142 Cal. 681, 76 Pac. 659 (1904). But an innkeeper is not
an insurer of his guests safety. Clancy v. Barker, 131 Fed. 161 (C. C. A 8th, 1904), Barry
v. Merriman, 215 App. Div. 294, 214 N. Y. Supp. 66 (2d Dep't. 1926).
21. Abbott v. N. Y. Public Library, 263 App. Div. 314, 32 N. Y. S. (2d) 963 (1st
Dep't. 1942) (public library); Easier v. Downie Amusement Co., 125 Me. 334, 133 AtI..
905 (1926) (circus), Durning v. Hyman, 286 Pa. 376, 133 Ati. 568 (1926) (theatre).
22. "A place of public accommodation, resort or amusement within the meaning of
this article, shall be deemed to include inns, taverns, roadhouses, . . . buffets, saloons,
barrooms . . ." N. Y. CrvIL RIGHTs LAW, § 40.
23. ". . the defendant having v6luntarily entered into a contract with her admitting
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the court expressly said, "he did not sustain toward them (his patrons) the tech-
nical relation of an innkeeper, nevertheless, as we understand the law, substantially
the same duties and obligations exist as to such persons." 24 However, in these cases
the injury to the plaintiff was occasioned by the unlawful act of an employee within
the bounds of his employment or by another invitee on the premises of whose vicious
propensities the defendant-proprietor had or should have had knowledge.
It is true that at times the trial court does emphasize the active nature of the
wrong committed by the defendants' employee; nonetheless, the language of the
opinion seems to reflect the court's opinion that the essential wrong committed
was the failure on the part of the employee to afford protection to the plaintiff.
It is submitted that the decision cannot be supported upon the latter theory but
solely upon the theory that the harm inflicted upon the plaintiff resulted proximately
from the active wrong of the bartender in pushing the plaintiff into the path of
foreseeable danger. On such a theory the decision would undoubtedly/be correct.25
The duty to refrain from affirmatively injuring another or placing him in danger
rests upon all men and not merely upon those in the restricted groups classified
above.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES-CORPORATION's LIABILITY-PARTIAL RETRIAL-WEALTHI OF
DEFENDANT AS EVIDENCE.-The station agent employed by the defendant corpora-
tion called the police and without any justification had plaintiff arrested while he
was in the defendant's bus depot waiting for a bus. Plaintiff sued for false arrest
and malicious prosecution. The trial court refused to submit the question of puni-
tive damages to the jury and the jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff in the
sum of $500. Plaintiff appealed on the ground that the trial court should have
submitted the question of punitive damages to the jury. field, judgment affirmed
but new trial ordered on the issue of punitive damages alone. It was further held
that on such new trial evidence of defendant's wealth would be admissible. Atkinson
v. Dixie Greyhound Lines, 143 F (2d) 477 (C. C. A. 5th, 1944).
her to the premises and agreeing to afford facilities for bathing, her status became similar
to that of a passenger of a common carrier or a guest of an innkeeper." Aaron v. Ward,
203 N. Y. 351, 357, 96 N. E. 736, 739 (1911). The recovery may be on either theory of
contract or tort. Gillespie v. Brooklyn Heights R. R., 178 N. Y. 347, 352, 70 N. E.
857 (1904).
24. MiKeon v. Manze, - Misc. -, 157 N. Y. S. 623 (Sup Ct. 1916). This is in
contrast to statements made by a court of another jurisdiction. 'In Peter Anderson & Co
v. Diaz, 77 Ark. 606, 92 S. W. 861 (1906) the court said, in discussing the difference
between the duties incumbent upon a saloonkeeper as compared with the common law
innkeeper; "There is a difference as wide as poles. The saloonkeeper does not hold himself
out to the public as the protector of those who may be patrons of his saloon. . . But
the common carrier and the innkeeper hold themselves forth as providing for the com-
fort and safety of all who may seek their services, a 'refuge through their portals.' It is
strictly their duty and their business to exercise the proper care to look after, and
to protect their passengers and guests from insult and ijijury (citing authority). Not' sD
with the saloon keeper."




The above decision involves three separate questions dealing with the problem
of punitive damages. They are, in the order in which they will be considered: (1)
the liability of a corporation for punitive damages resulting from acts of its agents
or employees, (2) whether an appellate court may direct a retrial of the issue of
punitive damages alone, and (3) whether evidence of the wealth of the defendant
is admissible on the issue of punitive damages.
A corporation can act only through its employees or agents. Upon the principle
of respondeat superior it is, as a general rule, responsible for compensatory dam-
ages to third parties for injuries caused by acts of any such employee or agent,
done within the scope of his employment even though such acts may be wanton,
willful, or malicious.1 With respect to punitive damages, however, several jurisdic-
tions,2 including the Federal Courts,3 hold that punitive damages'will be allowed
against a corporation only where they would be allowed against an individual in
like circumstances. Under these holdings a corporation is held liable only when
it had authorized the misconduct, or afterwards ratified it, or where the corporation,
before the wrongful act, knew that its employee or agent was unfit and, nevertheless,
retained him in its employ. 4 The reason for not allowing recovery is that the
very nature of punitive damages is puhishment and one who has not participated
in the wrong should not be punished as the law does not have as its purpose the
punishment of an innocent party, and therefore, unless there is proof that makes
the corporation particeps criminis of the employee's or agent's act, it is not guilty.5
1. Little Miami Ry. v. Wetmore, 19 Ohio St. 110 (1869) ; Osipoff v. City of New
York, 286 N. Y. 422, 36 N. E. (2d) 646 (1941); 2 MEcHm, Aezccy (2nd ed. 1914)
§ 2013.
2. Pollack v. Gantt, 69 Ala. 373 (1881); Maisenbacker v. Society Concordia, 71 Conn.
369, 42 Atl. 67 (1899); Cleghorn v. N. Y. Central R. R., 56 N. Y. 44 (1874); Pollack
v. Staten Island Rapid Transit Ry., 187 App. Div. 832, 176 N. Y. Supp. 551 (2nd Dep't
"1919).
3. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101 (1893); Milwaukee & St. P. Ry.
v. Arms, 91 U. S. 489 (1875). There was formerly some doubt whether the Federal
Courts would follow state decisions as to exemplary damages 'where the case was in the
Federal Court -on grounds of diversity of citizenship. See Trainor Co. v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co., 290 U. S. '47 (1933). However, since the decision in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,
304 U. S. 64 (1938), the Federal Courts are now bound to follow the rule in the state
court. This was done by the Federal Court in the principal case which followed the law
of Mississippi (where the action arose).
4. Cleghorn v. N. Y. Central R. R. 56 N. Y. 44 (1874), cited supra note 2; cf. Nephew
v. New York, 178 Misc. 824, 36 N. Y. S. (2d) 541 (Ct. Cl. 1942). It is interestin that
in the last cited case there was a claim for punitive damages against the State of New
York. The court found that there was insufficient evidence of ratification of the wrong-
ful act, but did not discuss the question of whether a sovereign state may be subjected
to such damages. Only a person representing the corporation in an authoritative or super-
visory capacity can authorize or ratify a wrongful act which will render the corporation
liable in punitive damages. Lake Shore & M. S. R. R. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101 at 114,
(1893) cited supra note 3; White v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 24 Fed. Supp.
871 (D. Ore. 1938); 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS, (1931) § 752.
5. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S. 101, 115 (1893).
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On the other hand, a large number of jurisdictions hold that a corporation may be
rendered liable in punitive damages by the willful, wanton, or malicious miscon-
duct of its employee or agent upon the same principle of respondeat superior which
would render the corporation liable for compensatory damages. 6 The reasoning upon
which these decisions are based is that the corporation can act only through natural
persons to whom it must intrust its business. 7 Insofar as such individuals represent
the corporation in their particular line of employment they are vested with the
entire power of the corporation.8 These decisions hold that both the doctrine of
respondeat superior and punitive damages are founded on public policy and are
equally applicable to a corporation without an authorization or ratification of an
agent's wrongful act by the corporation. In the instant case, under the latter view,
which prevails in Mississippi where the cause of action arose,9 it was not necessary
to show authority or ratification. Logic and justice appear to sustain the view that
ratification or authorization is necessary. There is no reason for a more severe rule
in the case of corporate employers than in that of individual employers.
The court in the instant case, having concluded that the question of punitive
damages should have been submitted to the jury, affirmed the judgment but directed
a retrial on the issue of punitive damages alone. When the sole objection to a
lower court's decision is as to the amount of damages, a retrial of all the issues
often may be avoided, thereby preventing unnecessary effort, repetition, and ex-
pense. While this procedure was unknown in the early common law,1 0 it has since
been frequently authorized by decision'" or statute.12 A partial new trial may
6. Atlantic & Great Western Ry. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio St. 162 (1869); Georgia Ry. v.
Dougherty, 86 Ga. 744, 12 S. E. 747 (1890); Citizens St. Ry. v. Willoeby, 134 Ind.
563, 33 N. E. 627 (1893); Memphis & C. Packet Co. v. Nagel, 97 Ky. 9, 29 S. W. 743
(.1895); Purcell v. Richmond & D. Ry., 108 N. C. 404, 12 S. E. 954 (1891).
7. Goddard v. Grand Trunk Ry., 57 Me. 202 (1869).
8. Louisville & N. R. R. v. Ballard, 85 Ky. 311, .3 S. W. 530 (1887).-
9. Southern Exp. Co. v. Brown, 67 Miss. 260, 7 So. 318 (1890); Pullman Palace Car
Co. v. Lawrence, 74 Miss. 782, 22 So. 53 (1897). See note 6 supra. ,
10. Parker v. Godin, 2 Stra. 800, 813, 93 Eng. Rep. Repr. 866 (1728); Gardner's
Administrator v. Vidal, 6 Rand. 106 (Va. 1828); Bernasconi v. Farebrather, 3 Barn &
Ad. 372, 110 Eng. Rep. Repr. 140 (1832).
11. Gasoline Products Co. v. Champ. 283 U. S. 494 (1931); Mathewson v. Colpitts,
284 Mass. 581, 188 N. E. 601 (1933); Busse v. White, 287 S. W. 600 (Mo. 1926);
Lisbon v. Lyman, 49 N. H. 553 (1870); Robinson v. Payne, 99 N. J. Law 135, 122
At. 882 (1923); Howell v. Murdock, 156 Va. 669, 158 S. E. 886 (1931); Comment (1934)
44 YALE L. J. 318, 322. Contra: McKeon v. Central Stamping Co., 264 F. 385 (C. C. A.
3rd, 1920); Krummen Bus Co. v. Mechanic's Lumber Co., 175 Ark. 750, 300 S. W. 389
(1927).
12. ARIz. REV. CODE (Struckmeyer, 1928) § 3852; CAIF. CODE PROC. (Deering, 1937)
§ 657, 662; CoNN. GEN. STAT. (1930) § 5695; FLA. Comp. GEN. LAWS ANN. (1927)
§ 4640; ILL. RFv. STAT. (1937) Ch. 110, § 216(f); KAN. REv. STAT. ANN. (1923) §
60-3004; MD. ANm. CODE (Bagby, 1924) Art. 5, § 25, 26; MASS. GEN. LAws (1932)
c. 231, § 128, MIcH. COURT RuLEs Am. (Searl, 1933) Rule 47, § 2; Miss. Sup. CT.
Rule 12, 161 Miss. 903, 905 (1931); 2 N. D. Comp. LAws ANm. (1913) § 7844, as amended
by N. D. Laws 1927.
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be properly granted when the error is one which could only affect the issue of
damages, such as the admission of evidence or an error in instructions relating
solely to damages. 13 It may not be so directed, however, unless the issues are so
distinct that a trial of some or one of them alone will not work an injustice.' 4 A
different view was expressed in a recent New York case, Hyle), v. Heyer,15 where
it was held that a partial retrial of the issue of damages alone would not be directed,
on the ground that the common law rule, which does not permit a partial retrial, still
exists in New York and has not been superseded, by statute. 16 This view is sup-
ported by other New York cases holding that upon an .appeal from a single judg-
ment the appellate court must either wholly affirm or reverse the decision of the
lower court.17 The economy and convenience of a partial retrial would appear to
suggest remedial legislation in New York to permit the course followed in the in-
stant case and in many states.' 8
There is a division of authority orq the question of the admission of evidence con-'
cerning the wealth of the defendant when punitive damages may be allowed. The
weight of authority seems to favor the admission of such evidence.' 9 New York
appears to be with the minority. An expression of opinion, by way of dictum, was
voiced in an early New York case, Fry v. Bennett,20 in which it was said that
the wrongdoer's circumstances very definitely determined whether or not punitive
damages will have the desired effect of punishing the wrongdoer. Another case held
13. May Department Stores Co. v. Bell, 61 F. (2d) 830 (C. C. A. 8th, 1932); Sim-
mons v. Fish, 210 Mass. 563, 97 N. E. 102 (1912).
14. McCarthy v. Wynne, 126 F. (2d)' 620 (C. C. A. 10th, 1942).
15. 177 Misc. 68, 29 N. Y. S. (2d) 223 (Sup. Ct., 1941).
16. The court was of the opinion that Section 549 of the New York Civil Practice
Act which provides for the granting of a new trial contemplates a retrial of the whole
case. The court said, "It would have been a simple thing for the Legislature, if it so
intended, to confer upon the trial court, the power to segregate the issues within a single
cause of action in the manner here sought by plaintiff. Unless the statute can be so con-
strued, plaintiff's motion must be denied since it has no basis at common law." Id. at 69,
29 N. Y. S. (2d) at 224.
17. Wolstenholme v. Wolstenholme File Mfg. Co., 64 N. Y. 272 (1876); Goodsell v.
Western Union Telegraph Co., 109 N. Y. 147, 16 N. E. 324 (1888); Nat'l Bd. of Marine
Underwriters v. Nat'l Bank of Republic, 146 N. Y. 64, 40 N. E. 500 (1895).
18. See notes 11 and 12, supra.
19. Hinton v. Muhlman, 201 Ill. App. 177 (1916); Schloss v. Silverman, 172 Md. 632,
192 Ati. 343 (1937) ; Pelton v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 139 Ore. 198, 7 P. (2d)
263 (1932) ; Hargroves v. Ballou, 47 R. I. 186, 131 Atl. 643 (1926) ; Herstein v. Kemker,
19 Tenn. App. 681, 94 S. W. (2d) 76 (1936); Weatherford v. Birchett, 158 Va. 741, 164
S. E. 535 (1932).
;0. 11 Super. Ct. 247, 4 Duer 247 (N. Y. 1855), aff'd, 28 N. Y. 324 (1863). This was
an action to recover damages for libel. In connection with the question whether the plain-
tiff was entitled to recover exemplary damages at all in the action, the court said,
"Damages which would be exemplary when inflicted upon a person in moderate circum-
stances, would be trivial, and in no practical sense exemplary, when imposed upon a
person whose property and income were very much larger."
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the evidence admissible as bearing upon the extent of injury due to the standing
and influence of the defendant, if for no other reason, the assumption being that
the words and actions of a person of wealth and influence are more apt to be noticed
and believed than those of an ordinary person. 21 Then the court in Palmer v.
Haskins,22 a case involving libel and slander, held such evidence inadmissible. This
latter rule has been followed in New York in cases where punitive damages might
be allowed,23 with the exception of one case.24 In the most recent case on this
point, Wilson v. Onmodaga Radio Broadcasting Corp,25 the court examined all of
the authorities and concluded that the decision in Palmer v. Haskins, represented the
law of New York. The court also was of the opinion that to measure punitive
or exemplary damages by the wealth of the defendant seems "far fetched." The
court said, "As well might the State impose a fine in a criminal case in accordance
with a defendant's ability to pay." But is it not a fact that in imposing a fine
the courts should and do consider the ability of the defendant to pay? The admis-
sion of such evidence, as permitted by the majority of jurisdictions and in the
principal case, seems the sounder view.26 The whole theory of punishment involved
in the doctrine of punitive damages makes the financial condition of the defendant
not only a relevant, but a determining, factor.
SPECIFIC PERFO MANCE--GRANTED TO VENDOR-ABATEMENT TO PURCHASER.-The
plaintiff vendor brought an action for specific performance of a contract for the
sale of farm land, defendant vendee being in possession and having made part pay-
ment of the purchase price, which was payable in installments. On default of the
last payment, plaintiff brought suit in equity, requesting payment of the last in-
stallment, or in the alternative, in lieu of such payment, forfeiture to the plaintiff
of all previous payments and restoration of the premises to the latter. Defendant
claimed failure of performance by plaintiff due to the fact that a narrow strip of
land on the north line of the premises was in the adverse possession of a third
21. Lewis & Herrick v. Chapman, 19 Barb. 252 (N. Y., 1855), rev'd on other grounds,
16 N. Y. 369, (1857). The wealth of the defendant may at times be relevant on the
question of actual damages. "But so far as the defendant's rank and influence in society,
and therefore the extent of the injury, are increased by his wealth, evidence of the fact
is pertinent to the issue." 2 GREENLE-a, EvmiDica (16th ed., 1899) § 269. In Chellis v.
Chapman, 125 N. Y. 214, 26 N. E. 308 (1891) evidence of the defendant's general reputa-
tion as to wealth was held admissible in a breach of promise action.
22. 28 Barb. 90 (N. Y., 1858).
23. Austin v. Bacon, 49 Hun 386, 3 N. Y. Supp. 587 (N. Y., 1888); Enos v. Enos,
58 Hun 45 (N. Y., 1890), aff'd, 135 N. Y. 609, 32 N. E. 123 (1892) ; Palmer v. Bailey,
33 App. Div. 642, 64 N. Y. Supp. 1111 (4th Dep't., 1898); Tymann v. Schwartz, 209
App. Div. 886, 205 N. Y. Supp. 493 (2nd Dep't, 1924)_
24. Klauber v. S. K. E. Operating Co., Ltd., 163 Misc. 418, 295 N. Y. Supp. 701 (Sup.
Ct., 1937), relying on 1 CLARic, Dm.rAGEs (1st ed., 1925), § 54, which in turn relied on
Fry v. Bennett, 11 Super. Ct. 247, 262, 4 Duer 247 (N. Y., 1855), cited supra note 20.
25. 175 Misc. 389, 23 N. Y. S. (2d) 654 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
26. See notes 19 and 20, supra.
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party. The trial court granted specific performance with a partial abatement of the
purchase price. Upon appeal, held, judgment reversed and specific performance re-
fused on the ground that the defect in title constituted a material deficiency because
it prevented access from defendant's land to a public highway. Friede v. Pool,
- Minn. - , 14 N. W. (2d) 454 (1944).
Specific performance of a contract to sell real estate, with compensation or abate-
ment for differing deficiencies in title, is a common remedy,' but this remedy is
not as readily available to the vendor as the vendee.2 This disparity is due to the
fact that the deficiency or failure is the fault of the vendor, not of the vendee.
Some authorities have overlooked this vital difference in holding that the right
of the vendor and that of the vendee to enforce specific performance is co-equal.
and depends merely on the materiality or degree of the deficiency. 3 But this is
not the basic test of specific performance and fails to take into consideration the
inherent nature of a contract for the sale of land4 in which the vendee, who is
not at fault, is grantad an option to accept or refuse specific performance and is
demanding not more than the vendor promised, while on the other hand the
vendor, if allowed specific performance, forces the vendee to accept less than he
is entitled to or contracted for.5
The 'vendee, when such deficiencies arise, may generally insist upon specific per-
formance without regard to the extent of the deficiency,6 but where the vendee was
aware of the deficiency before the contract of sale, specific performance as a rule,
will not be granted. 7
1. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) §§ 844, 1431. 2 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS
(1932) § 365.
2. Van Blarcom v. Hopkins, 63 N. J. Eq. 466, 471, 52 AtI. 147, 149' (1902). The
court says, "Specific performance . . . is given rarely in cases like the present, where
the vendor is seeking to enforce the contract." McWhorter v. McMahan, 1 Clarke Ch.
400; (N. Y. 1840), aff'd, 10 Paige 386 (N. Y. 1843); Waters v. Travis, 9 Johns. 450,
464, 465 (N. Y. 1812).
3. Tolchester Beach Improvement Co. v. Boyd, 161 Md. 269, 156 At. 795 (1931),
81 A. L. R. 895, 900 (1932).
4. WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (rev. ed. 1936) § 683.
5. Mundy v. Irwin, 20 N. M. 43, 145 Pac. 1080 (1915).
6. Townsend v. Vanderwerker, 160 U. S. 171, 182 (1895) in which the court said:
"But if the defendant [seller] has not wholly disabled himself from carrying out the
contract, he may be decreed to perform specifically so much as he is still able to perform,
and plaintiff may recover damages for the residue." Cf. Willard v. Tayloe, 8 Wall. 557
(U. S. 1869) where the court said that specific performance "will be withheld when, from
a like view, it appears that it will produce hardship or injustice to either of the parties.";
Leerburger v. Watson, 75 Misc. 3, 134 N. Y. Supp. 818 (Sup. Ct. 1912), aff'd 157 App.
Div. 915, 142 N. Y. Supp. 1127 (1913), aff'd 213 N. Y. 662, 107 N. E. 1080 (1915),
holding that specific performance will not be granted where it will result in the forma-
tion of a new contract.
7. POMEROY, SPECiC PERFORMANCE (3d ed. 1926) § 442, works out a theory some-
6vhat similar to an estoppel holding that a vendee cannot be heard to demand specific
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A different situation confronts the vendor. To justify a decree of specific perform-
ance in behalf of a vendor, the deficiency in question must be so unsubstantial that
it does not materially affect the value or enjoyment of the land actually conveyed.8
The case under discussion clearly exemplifies what the courts consider a material
deficiency. A new and convenient outlet from a farm to a public highway could
hardly be considered otherwise. The test applied is whether the deficiency involves
a considerable portion of the subject matter or is material to the enjoyment of the
other part.9 However, these criteria often produce decisions'which seem in direct
contradiction. Contrast a Maryland case10 wherein the contract was enforced against"
the vendee with a shortage of three acres out of a total of seven contracted for,
as against a New York decision" in which a four-foot deficiency in a lot 96 x 140
feet was fatal to the enforcement of the contract agains t the vendee. But these
cases are clearly distinguishable. In the former the shortage, though substantial, did
not materially affect the enjoyment of the land which was rural in character, while
in the lattbr, involving urban land, the footage lacking was vital to its enjoyment.
The two decisions do, however, point to a marked difference in the trend of decisions
involving land in the city as against that in the country. This marked difference
follows naturally from the, uses to which land is put in the two environments.
City land is almost entirely improved, only relatively small areas being left vacant
for light and air. Thus, a difference of a few feet, or even inches,12 may be con-
sidered a material deficiency. The uses and employments to which the land is put
emerges as the distinguishing factor when the materiality test is applied to urban
and rural districts. Following this line of thought, the instant case would seem
to be squarely in line with the general trend of decisions involving material defi-
ciencies in the light of rural standards. 3 ,
performance of a contract which he knew at the time he contracted could not be wholly
performed. This viewpoint is generally followed by the courts. Mundy v. Shellaberger,
161 Fed. 503 (C. ,C. A. 8th, 1908); McCray v. Buttell, 149 Minn. 487, 184 N. W. 191
(1921); Palmer v. Gould, 144 N. Y. 671, 39 N. E. 378 (1895).
8. Kenner v. Bitely, 45 Fed.'133 (W. D. Va, 1890) Tolchester Beach Improvement
Co. v. Boyd, et al., 161 Md. 269, 156 Atl. 795 (1931).
9. Tolchester Beach Improvement Co. v. Boyd, et al., 161 Md. 269, 156 Atl. 795
(1931), cited supra note 8.
10. Reigart v. Fisher, 149 Md. 336, 131 At]. 568 (1925). Specific performance was
granted to the vendor in this case even though there was a 43% deficiency in the total
area to be conveyed, the saving grace being that the 4 acres actually conveyed were the
most valuable and the ones on which the vendee intended to build a house.
11. Friedman v. Baron, 223 App. Div. 851, 228 N. Y. Supp. 546 (1st Dep't. 1928),
aff'd without opinion 250 N. Y. 612, 166 N. E. 344 (1929). The 4% deficiency in this
case represents a material deficiency because of the uses to which city land is put; archi-
tects usually planning to use even the last inch.
12. Siebel v. Cohen, 22 J. & S. 436, 437 (Super. Ct. N. Y. 1887).
13. In the following' chses the vendors were denied specific performance as to rural
properties because of material deficiencies involving either an ordinary quantitative defi-
ciency or a deficiency involving a strip of land which might impede or prevent an en-
trance into or exit from the granted premises: Kenner v. Bitely, 45 F. 133 (W. D. Va.
1944] 1 261
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The New York courts would appear to deny specific performance to vendors, even
when the deficiencies involved are small in contrast to those disclosing major defi-
ciencies. But this refusal to aid the vendor is apparently because the majority of
the decisions of its courts concern city real estate.14 In a metropolitan community,
slight variations in dimensions are qualitatively important. But the general rule of
granting specific performance to a vendor with abatement when the deficiency is
not material to the use or enjoyment of the land by the vendee is still followed
in New York.15 It just so happens that New York, due to its great urban popula-
tion, has had many specific-performance disputes involving urban real estate. This
is evidenced by a comparison of New York's urban-rural ratio with that of Pennsyl-
vania and Illinois.' 6 Such comparison shows that New York's urban population ex-
ceeds its rural population in the ratio of 5 to 1, which is greatly in excess of the
corresponding ratio in Pennsylvania or Illinois. In deciding these urban cases, the
New York courts have, of necessity, adjudged materiality of the deficiencies by
urban standards, thus apparentlyir giving effect to a stricter rule. In reality, how-
ever, New York is applying the general rule.
1890); Jacobs v. Revell, 2 Ch. 858 (1900); Arnold v. Arnold L. R. 14 Ch. Div. 270 (1877);
Perkins v. Ede, 16 Beavan 193, 51 Eng. Rep. 75; (1852).
14. The following New York cases involved city properties with deficiencies varying
from a few inches up to a few feet, and yet the vendor was denied specific performance
in all of them: Friedman v. Baron, 223 App. Div. 851, 228 N. Y. Supp. 546 (1st Dep't.
1928), aff'd without opinion 250 N. Y. 552, motion, for reargument denied 250 N. Y. 612
(1929); VonBargen v. Ginsberg, 218 App. Div. 545 (2d Dep't. 1926) aff'd 245 N. Y.
647; Floeting v. Horowitz, 120 App. Div. 492, 104 N. Y. Supp. 1037 (2d Dep't. 1907);
Raben v. Risnikoff, 95 App. Div. 68, 88 N. Y. Supp. 470, (2d Dep't. 1904); Siebel v.
Cohen, 22 J. & S. 436, 437 (Super. Ct. N. Y. 1887).
15. Winne v. Reynolds, 6 Paige Ch. 407 (N. Y. 1837). It is conceivable that the scar-
city of rural decisions in New York is due to the fact that the majority of them never
reach the stage of litigation, but rather, are settled over the back fence.




N. Y. 11,165,893 2,313,249 5-1
Pa. 6,586,877 3,313,303 2-1
I1. 5,809,650 2,087,591 2-1
17. However, in the following New York cases, immaterial deficiencies did not pre-
vent the vendor from getting specific performance. Riggs v. Pursell, 66 N. Y. 193 (1876) ;
Merges v. Ringler, 34 App. Div. 415, 54 N. Y. Supp. 280 (1st Dep't 1898); Keating v.
Gunther, 57 Hun 591, 10 N. Y. Supp. 734 (1890), aff'd 129 N. Y. 659, 30 N. E. 65
(1892) ; King v. Bardeau, 6 Johns. Ch. 38 (N. Y. 1822); accord, Beyer v. Marks, 2
Sweeny 715 (N. Y. 1870).
